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This BPhil thesis tells a story about stories—its central themes are origin myths 
and feminist reading.  The genres I explore are classic epic (I begin with my readings of 
Vergil’s Aeneid and Milton’s Paradise Lost) and feminist science fiction (I address 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, Woolf’s Orlando, Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time, and 
Russ’s The Female Man).   This paper traces the emergence of a feminist poetics in the 
science fiction texts, characterized by partiality and possibility.  I date its beginning to 
Shelley’s Frankenstein and see its further articulation in works of contemporary feminist 
science fiction.  However I will argue that we can read the great classic works, Vergil’s 
Roman epic and Milton’s Christian epic, with a sensitivity to partiality and possibility—
and see, if in episodes and irony, this poetics in broad literary historical perspective.   
 Taking the Aeneid in one view, we read it as a triumphant teleological narrative 
of the foundations of imperial Rome culminating in Turnus’s death an act of founding 
violence.  We can read Paradise Lost in the same way, a triumphant teleological narrative 
with Christ as its center and redemption and damnation as the only potential outcomes 
offered.  This paper is an attempt to recover other possibilities and other readings from 
these classics, by focusing on the figures of Dido, Eve, and Satan.  From the classics, this 
paper moves into performing readings of feminist science fiction.  I see Frankenstein as 
the beginning of this genre, and read this novel as the beginning and source of an explicit 
feminist poetics. Following my reading of Frankenstein, I move into discussing the work 
of contemporary feminist science fiction.  Here, I analyze the poetics of a genre that is 
explicitly feminist in order to understand the feminist work of constructing new 
narratives and new words.   
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The Poetry of the Fallen:  Tragic agency, authorship, and narratives of the human in epic + 
feminist science fiction 
My BPhil research originated with my reading of Donna Haraway’s polemical essay “A 
Cyborg Manifesto” and its “effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, 
socialism, and materialism” (149).  Haraway sets the origin myth of her cyborg in opposition to 
what she describes as origin stories in the Western sense:  
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-
oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a 
final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg 
has no origin story in the Western sense — a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the 
awful apocalyptic telos of the 'West's' escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an 
ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space. An origin story in the 
'Western', humanist sense depends on the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, 
represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate, the task of 
individual development and of history, the twin potent myths inscribed most powerfully 
for us in psychoanalysis and Marxism. (150-1) 
Following Haraway’s critique of origin myths, I ventured into a project that I thought would be a 
comparison of classic origin myths (Aeneid, Paradise Lost and Frankenstein) and the new origin 
myths of the cyborg in contemporary science fiction (the authors of which Haraway identifies as 
‘theorists for cyborgs’(173)).  I expected to find this appeal to a higher and original unity in the 
narratives and language of these classical origin stories.  Haraway herself suggests by allusion 
the importance of Paradise Lost and Frankenstein:  
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 The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is 
oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. No longer structured by the 
polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a technological polis based partly on a 
revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. Nature and culture are 
reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the 
other. The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and 
hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of 
Frankenstein's monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a 
restoration of the garden; that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through 
its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The cyborg does not dream of 
community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The 
cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream 
of returning to dust. Perhaps that is why I want to see if cyborgs can subvert the 
apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust in the manic compulsion to name the Enemy. 
(151) 
In analyzing these classical origin myths, especially in the case of the epic poems, I sought and 
certainly found Haraway’s polarity and hierarchical domination in their formation of 
wholes/narratives from parts/episodes. Still I was plagued by the nagging desire to rescue 
something of the universal classic from what seems like her wholesale dismissal of myths like 
Vergil’s Aeneid and Milton’s Paradise Lost.  This paper is an attempt to accomplish something 
of that work.  With resolute commitment, I hope to capture something of that “partiality, irony, 
intimacy, and perversity” represented in the tragedies of Dido, Eve, and Frankenstein’s monster 
with that same effort to find it in contemporary origin stories of cyborgs.   
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The Roman narrative of humanity and history, or How do we read Dido?
1
 
I begin with Vergil, whose poetry T.S. Eliot found appropriate to use in order to 
“rehearse the characteristics” of his definition of the classic.  Speaking of the necessity of 
maturity of mind to create a classic, Eliot remarks upon this comparative historical consciousness 
which will inform my overall methodology and my thinking about Vergil’s great poem:  
“Consciousness of history cannot be fully awake, except where there is other history than the 
history of the poet’s own people:  we need this in order to see our own place in history” (122).  
Here, Eliot is speaking specifically of the Roman historical consciousness by comparison to the 
Greeks, whose minds Eliot supposed could not have been comparative.  Vergil’s indebtedness to 
Greek minds and words has been well covered, and adding to this scholarly conversation is 
beyond the scope of this project and my knowledge of Greek. However, Eliot’s notion of 
Vergil’s comparative historical consciousness is useful to me when applied to a reading of the 
Aeneid that considers the historical ‘others’ represented in the poem.   
Looking at the poem’s representation of those two tragic figures by focusing on Dido/her 
Carthage and alluding to Turnus/his rustic Italy, my reading of the poem seeks to bring the 
comprehensiveness of Vergil’s epic back into the light.  This comprehensiveness, another 
necessary characteristic of the classic which Eliot identified—the condition of representing the 
full range of feeling of those who speak the language of a work’s composition in the case of the 
relative (or national) classic and in the case of the absolute or universal classic the capacity to 
“find its response among all classes and conditions of men” (128). Stanley Lombardo invokes 
the universal and comprehensive nature of Vergil’s classic in the introduction to his recent 
translation—identifying this universality “for diverse readers in very different times” in Aeneas 
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 Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.  Citations are from the Mynors OCT. 
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as representative of the human capacity to endure suffering, “a sort of epic Everyman, one who 
escapes by the skin of his teeth from being dispatched on what Hegel would call ‘the slaughter 
bench of history’ and thereby comes to incarnate the capacity of human beings to endure 
existence on the brink of ruin—and then to begin again and to flourish” (xvi). The major 
narrative of the Aeneid is Rome’s foundation, yet Aeneas will not succeed without suffering 
himself and causing suffering—this is the poetical and political crux of the Aeneid.  In order to 
interpret the Aeneid I will attempt to untangle the central narrative element of fate and the central 
thematic element of suffering in the poem—but do so, not focusing on the poem’s hero, but the 
tragical figure Dido.  For me the question of the poem’s comprehensiveness is not just about 
Aeneas’s ability to endure suffering and his triumph, but also about how we feel with those 
characters who cannot endure in this world centered on Rome.  
I hope to skirt around the edges of that conflict which is so prominent in Vergil studies, 
the question of the poem’s relationship with Augustanism. In her provocative Vergil’s Empire:  
Political Thought in the Aeneid Eve Adler cites and departs from this critical conflict centering 
around how to read this relationship of fate and suffering, or put differently epic history and 
tragedy, in the poem—“the most controversial question in contemporary interpretation of 
Vergil’s Aeneid” is whether the poem is “pro-Augustan or anti-Augustan, pro-imperial or anti-
imperial, pro-Roman or anti-Roman” (ix).  Like Adler, I wish neither to dive into this debate, nor 
privilege fate over suffering, but take the historical (narrative) with the tragic (affective).  Even 
those Aeneid scholars who differ greatly on the ‘pro’ vs. ‘anti’ question tend to agree on the 
centrality of these elements’ dynamic interaction in the poem.  Speaking of Bivocalism—that 
thread of Aeneid criticism which recognizes a ‘voice’ in the Aeneid opposed to its Augustan 
project, known also as ‘The Harvard School’—Nicholas Horsfall credits Vergil’s tragic voice, or 
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(as he cites Adam Parry’s term) his ‘private voice of regret,’ saying “Now it would be mere 
intellectual hebetude or idle perversity to deny this ‘voice’s existence and no attempt will be 
made to question Vergil’s doubts about glory, strength of feelings for victims and vanquished, 
repeated expressions of criticisms at the expense of heroes and victors, and the like” (193).  He 
argues that the ‘anti’ reading, however, “is almost exactly as degrading a parody of an extremely 
complex original as the complete vindication of Aeneas in a spirit of righteous triumphalism” 
(194). Lombardo introduces his translation with similar stress on Vergil’s feeling for those who 
suffer, but differs in his understanding of at least the poem’s reception, if not the poem, as 
tending toward the ‘anti’ or tragic: 
…in constructing his celebration of Rome’s empire, Vergil never loses sight of the huge 
costs of the victory he is praising…Impressed by this steady emphasis on suffering and 
loss, some readers of the poem feel that its representations of imperial glory tend to be 
overshadowed by an opposing tragic vision. (xv) 
I believe this readerly recognition of the recurrence of suffering and the tragic ‘voice’ in the 
Aeneid along with its historical narrative of Roman triumph is not only accurate but fruitful too. 
I will attempt to combine this readerly empathy for the poem’s suffering with a ‘New Augustan’ 
reading of its narrative, which Horsfall suggests is ‘reading in terms of ancient, not modern 
values,” a worthwhile pursuit (194).   
The magnificently structured proem of Vergil’s Aeneid (I.1-33) introduces multum in 
parvo.  That most famous opening bit “Arma uirumque cano” indicates the structural elements of 
the Aeneid chiastically, his individual narrative (the representation of his Trojan past, his present 
journey toward Italy and life in Carthage, and his Roman future in Books I-VI) and the social 
narrative (war in Italy and the actions that allow for the origination of the Roman future in Books 
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VII-XII).  Fleshing out the picture, the first seven lines of the poem demonstrate the historical 
context and thematic situation of this epic.  The lines, “…Troiae qui primus ab oris / Italiam fato 
profugus Lauiniaque uenit … (I.1-2), demonstrate in their word order the movement of Aeneas 
from his origin in Troy to his fated Italian destination and introduce the central place of historical 
fate in this Roman origin myth.  Already, these lines have indicated the range of the poem’s 
narrated events and its thematics of suffering and fate—from the fall of Troy (Book II) to the end 
of Aeneas’s struggles in battle.  It is also worth noting that before the reader experiences even the 
first of the narrative she knows Aeneas’s particular destination, Italy.  She also learns that when 
Aeneas arrives in Italy this land will have already been inhabited and Aeneas will go to war—
this is the last episode of his suffering after many until he can found his city and carry his gods 
into Italy, “multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem / inferretque deos Latio…” (I.5-6). 
Next the poem anticipates the invocation to the Muse (I.8-11)—first by introducing the 
theme of human suffering in a world of divine forces, here Aeneas’s suffering at the hands of 
cruel Iuno “ui superum, saevae memorem Iunonis ob iram” (I.4), and second by introducing the 
larger historical framework and teleological purpose of this narrative (I.5-7).  Hurled across 
lands and on the deep, Aeneas will suffer until he founds a city in Latium and carries the Trojan 
gods into Latium—these introductory words project events even farther into the future and trace 
Aeneas’s legacy from his Latium, to Ascanius’s Alba Longa, all the way up to the walls of lofty 
Rome, “altae moenia Romae” (I.6-7).  
The rest of the proem renders the historical and thematic stakes of the Aeneid more 
vividly.  Vergil invokes the Muse for aid in his investigation of cause, an intention the Aeneid 
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shares with Paradise Lost more than its Homeric predecessors (cf. PL I.1-6, 24-6 and VI.788)
2
 —
Why would the queen of the gods force Aeneas, renowned as a dutiful man, to weather 
calamities so great and to undergo such labors?  Can divine minds harbor such wrath?  The poem 
immediately addresses the causes of Iuno’s anger, subordinating the Iliadic roots of this anger 
(I.23-30) to the goddess’s preference for Carthage over Rome in the two empires’ battle for 
hegemony (I.12-22)—this subordination is both explicit “Karthago… / quam Iuno fertur terris 
magis omnibus unam / posthabita coluisse Samo…” (I.13,5-6) and grammatical “id metuens 
ueterisque memor Saturnia belli / prima quod ad Troiam pro caris gesserat Argis” (I.23-4).  
These lines about Dido’s city are significant for two reasons.  They place the narrative within a 
human/historical framework on top of its epic/mythological causes, drawing the Roman reader to 
use his historical consciousness to read these millennium-old events in terms of the more recent 
Punic Wars. In these lines Iuno first receives the epithet Saturnia, which appears when she is 
acting most at odds with things driven by fate and the will of Iuppiter (cf. IV.92, VII.622)
3
.   
Already the proem has outlined the sides and the stakes of its events, putting Iuno (first 
with Dido/Carthage and later Turnus/Italy) at odds with fate/Aeneas/Iuppiter/Rome.  If a reader 
does not have an idea of the outcome of Vergil’s narrative by the end of the seven-line 
introduction, she certainly does by the end of the proem ending with a declaration of Aeneas’s 
success despite the central thematic and plot element, struggle/suffering—“tantae molis erat 
Romanam condere gentem”—so great a struggle it was to found the Roman race (I.33). It is 
                                                
2
 The poet’s interjection in Paradise Lost VI.788, “In Heav’nly spirits could such perverseness 
dwell?” is one of the most direct instances of Milton’s Vergilian imitation.  
3
 In Aeneid IV Iuno plans marriage between Dido and Aeneas (126-7) and an alliance between 
the Trojans and Tyrians, attempting to subvert the fated foundation of Rome.  In Aeneid VII she 
opens the Latins’ ceremonial war-gates herself, kindling war in previously untroubled Italy ruled 
by the peaceful and inert Latinus.  The language of this passage immediately following, with 
each word beginning with a vowel and the disturbed cadence of “Ausonia”, is as remarkable as 
the moment of the war’s violent eruption: ardet inexcita Ausonia atque immobilis ante (623). 
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important to reject ways of reading like the one R.D. Williams suggests in the introductory note 
to his Aeneid I-VI commentary—“We are never sure, as the poem develops, whether he 
[Aeneas] will succeed” (155)—because history and the poem necessitate Aeneas’s success, 
necessitate that Aeneas endures what he suffers.  Further, even before the poem introduces the 
human agents associated with Iuno—you expect (correctly) that these humans belong to tragical 
Aeneid.  Keeping in mind the larger picture of the poem in toto, Dido’s narrative in life (I, IV) 
and death (VI) will be the focus of my reading—appropriate for she is a major, if not the 
primary, figure of human suffering in the poem.  Reading with Dido, we can gain insight into the 
Aeneid not only in its historical context but also understand how the poem demonstrates that 
necessary characteristic of the absolute classic, speaking to a full range of feelings.  How does 
the poem allow us to feel with Dido, while we keep in mind its triumphant narrative of Rome’s 
foundation?  
 Dido’s suffering, her ‘place on the slaughter bench of history’ is a historical necessity of 
the narrative, indeed her tragic end has already crept into the narrative of the Aeneid in the 
proem—these introductory lines have sown the seeds not only of Aeneas’s fated foundation of 
the Roman race, but also of Dido and Carthage’s suffering and fall with the allusion to the 
Roman victory in the Punic Wars (I.22).  While the proem introduces her Carthage, Dido first 
enters the Aeneid (I.299) immediately after Iuppiter’s prophetic revelation of the Fates to Venus 
(I.257-96), in which he declares “unrolling the scroll, I will throw light on the hidden secrets of 
the fates” (I.262).  The primary function of this passage is to offer Venus comfort (and the reader 
further assurance) that despite her son’s present suffering he will found the promised city and 
find his place in glory among the stars.  Iuppiter’s prophecy also offers a justification for 
suffering in the poem—its historical telos of Augustan peace (I.291-6).  Iuppiter then commands 
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Mercury to make Carthage welcoming to Aeneas and his party, “lest, ignorant of fate, Dido shut 
up her borders” (I.299-300).  Two things about Dido’s introduction are noteworthy—it makes 
known that Dido may act against Aeneas’s fate and, while the passage occurs a beat after 
Iuppiter’s revelation of fate in the poem, Iuppiter’s/Mercury’s actions do nothing to make Dido 
otherwise than unknowing, ‘fati nescia.’ 
 The poem elevates this irony when Aeneas first spies Carthage and apostrophizes to the 
city—“O fortunate ones, whose walls rise already!” (I.437)—this historical irony would be 
readily apparent to a Roman reader with the Punic Wars near the front of his mind.  Yet, from 
the outset Vergil renders Dido robustly and with parallels to Aeneas.  As a fugitive she led an 
overseas voyage and founded a city—Vergil captures the magnificence of this deed in his brief 
formulation “dux femina facti” (I.364).  We see her citadel and society rising, and her people 
laying the foundations of infrastructure and institutions, through Aeneas’s marveling eyes and a 
simile about a bustling and productive hive (I.421-35).  The magnificent representations of the 
Trojan War on the walls of Dido’s temple to Iuno demonstrate that Dido has knowledge of and 
shares in Aeneas’s history and his gods (but her allegiance is to the altar of Iuno, not Iuppiter’s).   
 Despite her excellences, the poem deliberately creates a tragic situation for Dido—she 
has offered Aeneas great hospitality, rule of their kingdoms side-by-side (pariter, I.572), and 
Aeneas offers a gracious and laudatory speech wishing her an eternal name and honor (I.595-
610). “While the rivers still flow to the sea, while the shadows still play on they valleys and 
mountains, while the heavens still feed the stars, honor and praise will always adhere to your 
name, whatever lands call me” (I.607-10).  These words have their own irony, the kind of 
immortal fame Aeneas wishes for Dido, that is as his generous host and succor, will not be hers.  
Rome and Carthage are not two entities that can endure side-by-side rule and other lands do call 
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Aeneas—the reader begins to apprehend the tension between Dido and Aeneas’s fated ends, 
mounting further as Dido shows signs of love after Venus/Cupid’s divine intervention and her 
banquet conversation with Aeneas.   
 Aeneas’s narration of the final moments of the Trojan War and his long journey from 
Troy to Carthage comprise Books II and III, and we learn Aeneas’s history as Dido hears it.  We 
learn of further affinities between Dido and Aeneas—most importantly their shared strength of 
character, the capacity to overcome suffering, and the authority to lead (rulership for Dido 
already, current captainship and fated rule for Aeneas).  As Venus recounted Dido’s receiving 
the fortunate warning to flee Tyre from the shade Sychaeus (I.353-9), Aeneas recounts receiving 
his sacred mission from the shade of Hector in a dream to carry the Trojan Penates into a new 
city (II.293-5).  Having carried his father and son from the burning city in a resounding display 
of filial piety and patriotic duty, Aeneas learns more from the shade of his wife who fell behind, 
Creusa.  Creusa first reveals Aeneas’s Italian destination and fate to him—“A long exile and 
plowing the vast surface of the sea is your fate, yet you will come to Hesperian land…there, 
joyous things, a kingdom and a queen for your wife are readied for you” (II.780-1, 3-4).   
The reader has long known of Aeneas’s Italian fate by her position in history, the 
language of the proem, and the Zeus/Venus prophetic episode but the Creusa episode of 
Aeneas’s narrative demonstrates that Aeneas is aware that his fate is directed toward Italy. We 
also see Dido hear of Aeneas’s future and begin to understand the impossibility of side-by-side 
rule in Africa. Book III mainly serves the purpose of establishing that Aeneas’s attempts to settle 
outside of Italy are consistently met with failure--the Polydorus incident in Thrace, the plague in 
Crete, and Helenus’s prophecy add further confirmation to Creusa’s shade’s words/ Cassandra’s 
prophecy of his Italian destination (III.394, VII.116) . Book III also creates a narrative of 
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homecoming to Italy through the Trojan father Dardanus (III.500-4) that confers historical 
authority to Aeneas in addition to divine authority.  The episode of Book III, with Helenus and 
Andromache settled in their city, demonstrates that Aeneas is the lone Trojan man fit for and 
called to the fated rulership in Latium and foundation of Rome.  The episode simultaneously sets 
Aeneas straight on course to crash into Dido and returns the narrative back to the first book with 
the calamity at sea stirred up by Iuno and Aeolus.  While the narrative of Books I and IV can be 
(and has been) read as the stand-alone story of Aeneas and Dido’s love and her tragedy, by 
keeping in mind the prescriptions of Books II and III this book takes on greater tragic force.  
With the historical and divine causes lined up, Dido’s situation reveals itself immediately 
upon the narrative’s return to her court in Book IV. Beyond Dido’s devotion past the grave to 
Sychaeus, Books II and III reveal that Aeneas’s fate stands opposed to her feeling.  Inflamed by 
Aeneas’s virtues and life’s tale (as well as her sister Anna’s words and the machinations of 
Iuno/Venus/Cupid), Dido is in love. Hearing Aeneas’s narrative along with Dido, we empathize 
with her—a feeling that our position of historical irony intensifies and complicates.  The 
difficulty of her situation rises to desperate and impossible levels when Iuppiter Omnipotens 
(IV.220) sends Mercury to shake Aeneas out of his Carthaginian repose  (IV.219-78) after 
Aeneas and Dido’s night in a cave orchestrated by Iuno and Venus—Dido took this to be a 
marriage (IV.172). Aeneas’s Roman fate stands in direct opposition to her desires—the reader 
knows well how history motivates Iuppiter’s blustering message to Aeneas and Aeneas’s 
awestruck obedience.  His language is powerful, appealing to both Aeneas’s desire and duty to 
propagate the Roman race from the Trojan’s high birth (IV.230-1) and the (notably, though just 
through allusion, Augustan) political end to send the whole world under the rule of law (IV.231).  
The poetry of this sentence reinforces Iuppiter’s message—beginning with nascent empire and 
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raging war, the sentence climaxes with Aeneas’s future Italiam regeret and the future Roman 
race (IV.231) and expands out into the whole word order.  The subjunctive mood of regeret 
demonstrates the uncertainty in this moment of Aeneas’s fate based upon his present actions—
Iuppiter accuses him of acting against the fate his mother worked for in saving him from battle 
twice at Troy (IV.228-9), the same fate Iuppiter previously prophesied in the future indicative 
“bellum ingens geret Italia populosque ferocis / contundet moresque uiris et moenia ponet, / 
tertia dum Latio regnantem uiderit aestas / ternaque transierint Rutulis hiberna subactis” (I.263-
6)  He then berates Aeneas—if he is moved neither by the glory of such great events (IV.232) 
nor his own honor (IV.233), does he begrudge Ascanius the Roman citadels? (IV.234-7).  In the 
course of Iuppiter’s speech Dido is sent to the ‘slaughter bench of history’—she is an enemy of 
the future.  The remarkable hiatus of Iuppiter’s pejorative question between the words hope and 
hostile, “…at qua spe inimica in gente moratur” (IV.235) –“In what hope does he dally among 
this hostile race, not looking to the Ausonian race or the Lavinian fields?” (IV.235-6)—is only 
outdone by the final resounding subjunctive command—“Let him sail!  This is paramount, let 
this be our message” (IV.237). Iuppiter reads Carthage’s and Rome’s future enmity back onto 
Dido and her city (inimica, IV.235), though Dido has done nothing hostile to Aeneas—quite the 
opposite in fact.   
After a moment of shock and awe, dutiful Aeneas resolves to pursue fate rather than 
feeling and begins to consider his exit strategy (IV.279-95).  Foreknowing Aeneas’s plans, Dido 
is driven into the first stage of her tragic downfall.  Driven out of doors in a rage compared to a 
Bacchic frenzy, the action of Dido’s tragedy begins.   The narrative of Book IV pushes Dido 
farther and farther into the margins of history and humane treatment.  We get the first inkling of 
this in the poet’s description of Dido’s state of mind after her night with Aeneas in the cave—she 
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invokes marriage, she cloaks her sense of shame in this name (IV.172).  We see it even more 
clearly in Aeneas’s calculatedly cold and final denial of Dido’s accusations, and more 
importantly his denial of Dido’s last heart-wrenching plea for a ‘parvulus Aeneas’ for her 
comfort (IV.327-30).  While the substance of Aeneas’s reply is true (their love was not marriage, 
he had no intent to leave in secret, and fate necessitates his departure), Aeneas does not speak in 
a style true to his feeling.  The poet introduces his words by drawing attention to Aeneas’s lack 
of authenticity to his feelings—he fixed his gaze, unmoving, upon the admonitions of Jove / and 
deep in his heart, resolute, he repressed love (IV.331-2).  The language brings further focus to 
Aeneas’s denial of feeling through the use of rhyming line endings (…immota tenebat /…sub 
corde premebat), rare in the poem.   Dido, driven into terrible dreams of wandering alone (sola 
sibi, incomitata IV.467) in the desert and eventually into unsleeping disquiet while the world 
sleeps (IV.522-533), makes the choice that finalizes her tragedy.  She pretends preparation for a 
magical rite that will restore or remove her love for Aeneas, but it is truly a preparation for her 
suicide. The sublime image she uses to describe the pretended priestess’s power—stopping the 
rivers, blotting out the stars, moving the earth, and setting trees walking (IV.489-91)—is not 
indeed a description of actual magical power.  Instead, taken with Aeneas’s tribute to Dido 
(I.607-10), it is in a way a description of the historical and legendary consequences of Dido’s 
suicide—she moves from a position of honor and praise, to historical opposition projected into 
the future (especially with Hannibal in IV.622-9) and tragic pathos. 
The final lines representing Dido’s death are especially striking because they show that 
not only was Dido’s way outside of Roman fate (even though the Carthaginian/Roman enmity 
and the figure of Hannibal emerge from her IV.622-9 curse), but her death was not ordained by 
fate.  Iuno sends Iris down to relieve Dido from suffering and send her to death, “since she was 
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dying neither by fate nor a death she desired, but wretched and before her day, inflamed with 
sudden fury” (I.696-7).  My reading of Dido’s suicide as willed freely does not differ from major 
lines of commentary, but I believe its significance has been underplayed.  This freely willed 
suicide of a woman with a strong capacity for love and a robust sense of dignity adds much more 
to the Aeneid’s narrative than is necessitated by the history of Carthage and Rome’s enmity.  
While it could be argued that the Aeneid allows for an interpretation that places Dido’s tragedy 
within a hierarchy dominated by Rome, this last episode in Dido’s narrative enacts empathy for 
Dido and demonstrates her full historical agency—in doing so, it invites the reader to feel with 
Dido at the same time that it invites the reader to conjure up an image of the world where events 
beyond Roman fate are possible.   
In Dido’s choice to die as a result of her suffering we apprehend something of the stakes 
of the felicitous Roman imperial project.   Political rule and love between equals are some of the 
these stakes—certainly a loss for Aeneas (thinking of his suppression of feeling in his 
justification to Dido, and the lack of any real fleshing out of Lavinia’s character) as well as Dido. 
We learn of its other stakes like the lives of virtuous youths (with the deaths of Pallas and Lausus 
in Book X) and the violence done against those living on the land which empire seeks to conquer 
(Books VII-XII, especially Amata driven out of the city in Bacchic revelry VII and to suicide 
XII) in the Iliadic half.   The sublime moment in Book VI, imitating the underworld scene in 
Odyssey XI, renders grandly the depths of Dido’s feeling and suffering when her shade turns 
away from Aeneas without a word in the underworld— “She holding her eyes fixed away from 
him, her countenance no more moved by the appeal he had begun than tough flint or marble can 
be moved.  At last she tore herself away, and as his enemy, fled to the shadowy forest” (VI.469-
73).  Dido’s final moment allows readers to turn away from the narrative of Roman fate, history, 
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and glory (if only briefly or partially) and to comprehend its darkness made visible in her 
suffering.  
The Christian narrative of humanity and history, or How do we read with Eve? 
Beginning in Vergilian form, the seeds of Eve’s disobedience and of humanity’s woe are 
sown in Paradise Lost’s first lines—the poem begins with the fallen-ness and suffering that are 
so essential to its definition of the human.  The poem’s account of human history is a teleological 
Christian account, presented in brief:  
Of Man’s first disobedience and the fruit  
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste  
Brought death into the world and all our woe  
With loss of Eden till one greater Man  
Restore us and regain the blissful seat 
  Sing Heav’nly Muse… (I. 1-6) 
Milton’s subject matter is divine Providence and cause, which he seeks to justify through a 
narrative account of human history beginning causally with the Fall.  Man’s presence is 
prominent in these opening lines as they run the course of human history from the Fall (first 
disobedience) to the apocalypse at the end of the Christian redemptive narrative (when Christ 
will restores us and regain the blissful seat). These introductory lines end in bliss and the 
invocation of the Holy Spirit, but their language already speaks of fallen-ness and suffering—the 
thick language of “disobedience,” “forbidden,” “mortal,” “death,” “woe,” “loss” weigh heavy 
against the positive final turn.  Taking death and suffering to be a given of reality, the apologetic 
poem seeks to justify our woeful condition within omnibenevolent divine unity—“That to the 
heighth of this great argument / I may assert Eternal Providence / And justify the ways of God to 
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men” (I.24-6).  As such, the relationship between the human (in time, historical), the divine and 
the demonic (spiritual, out of time, mythic/theological) forms the shape of Paradise Lost.  
Providence orders the poem and its order is hierarchical, placing its human narrative 
within a spiritual whole.  Adam learns from Raphael of the unification of all things within the 
divine:   
O Adam! one Almighty is, from whom  
All things proceed and up to Him return  
If not depraved from good, created all  
Such to perfection, one first matter all 
Endued with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance and in things that live of life,  
But more refined, more spiritual and pure 
As nearer to him placed or nearer tending,  
Each in their several active spheres assigned 
Till body up to spirit work in bounds 
Proportioned to each kind… (V. 469-79)   
Raphael here posits that corporeal things are contained within the greater realm of the spirit.  All 
things have been issued from the divine and all things ‘not depraved’ are on their way back to 
unity with God.  The trajectory of history runs towards (re)unification with the divine, all things 
having been assigned a place in the ‘active’ sphere of human history ‘till body up to spirit work 
in bounds.’  Indeed, in order to establish an understanding of Paradise Lost we must look not 
only at the poem’s account of humankind’s history but also read this within its representation of 
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divine events, a ‘history’ of the spirit—this will reveal how those opposite forces of suffering 
and salvation create the human in this poem.   
 The ‘history’ of the spirit is hardly a history, in that the spiritual transcends (is outside of) 
the corporeal and the temporal.  Yet, the movement of the spiritual contains and determines the 
trajectory of human history.  In order to interpret these two temporalities together, we must look 
at the structure of the poem’s narration of angelic treachery and human disobedience in both the 
corporeal world, Eden, and the spiritual realms of Heaven and Hell.  Satan and Eve are the major 
actors in the narrative and are the dual focal points of this analysis.     
The whole of the genealogy of the spirit in Paradise Lost, all creation both divine and 
demonic, exists beyond the time of its narration.  Satan, the Arch-Enemy, receives first 
introduction in the narrative and the mother of mankind (I.36) receives her introduction with 
him.  Satan poses the most significant problem for Milton’s Christian unity—mutiny in the spirit 
realm, evil at the side of the Most High.  The poem introduces him as spatially removed from 
God as is conceivable, a spirit Titan and divine warrior, in epic description heightened to the 
sublime. Satan and his cohort of disgraced angels find themselves in ‘bottomless perdition 
(I.47),’ having just now finished their descent of  
Nine times the space that measures day and night 
To mortal men he with his horrid crew  
Lay vanquished rolling in the fiery gulf  
Confounded though immortal… (I. 50-3)   
This opening scene of the poem renders a paradise already lost, Satan and his cohort’s loss of 
Heaven, spiritual Paradise. Separated from the divine by vast space, these fiends are least 
spiritual and pure—immortal spirits locked away from God to be punished eternally.  Sin and 
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Death, already born of Satan, have been cast into this realm as well. The descent from spiritual 
paradise is already a forgone conclusion of the narrative, necessary to explore Eve’s temptation 
and Adam and Eve’s loss of paradise while still maintaining divine unity within the poem for the 
sake of the argument.      
Milton makes a similar move in his representation of Adam and Eve.  The first word of 
them beyond the proem occurs in Satan’s reportage of “that prophecy or tradition in Heaven 
concerning another world” (Book II Argument).  The narrator reflects upon Beëlzebub’s 
proposal, first devised by Satan—“…our joy upraise / In His disturbance wben His darling sons / 
Hurled headlong to partake with us shall curse / Their frail originals and faded bliss— / Faded so 
soon!” (II.372-6)—to redeem their fall by creating the fall of humanity. 
    …For whence 
 But from the author of all ill could spring 
So deep a malice to confound the race 
Of mankind in one root and Earth with Hell  
To mingle and involve, done all to spite 
The great Creator?  But their spite still serves 
His glory to augment… (II. 380-6) 
In some sense Satan has the power to author even within the unity of the great Creator—he is the 
author of the fall and so the causal force beginning human history.   
However, the first narrative representation of the material world is focused through God 
and Christ’s perspective, introducing Eden and “Our two first parents,” “reaping immortal fruits 
of joy and love” (III. 65, 7). Adam and Eve’s story also begins in medias res.  Their genesis is 
only recounted later in Adam’s discourse with Raphael. The Father foretells the course of human 
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history to the Son.  Humanity’s fall is necessary for the poem’s justification of Providence—Eve 
and Adam too are authors to themselves. 
     …If I foreknew 
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault  
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.  
So without least impúlse or shadow of fate  
Or aught by me immutably foreseen 
They trespass, authors to themselves in all  /…/ 
Self-tempted, self-depraved.  Man falls deceived  
By th’ other first:  Man therefore shall find grace,  
The other none… (III. 117-122, 130-2) 
Now, together with these prescribed beginnings to their temporalities, the Father reveals the telos 
of man, woman and Satan.  Satan’s damnation is eternal, while humankind will be offered 
spiritual redemption through Christ, an opportunity for (re)unification with the divine.   
 Satan reaches this telos in narrative time—made a corporeal creature in Hell eternally 
tantalized by phantom fruit.   
 This, more delusive, not the touch but taste 
 Deceived.  They, fondly thinking to allay 
 Their appetite with gust, instead of fruit 
 Chewed bitter ashes… (X. 563-6) 
God also foretells that the Son will ultimately eradicate all spiritual evil, vanquishing Sin and 
Death and restoring unity between Heaven and Earth. Michael gives Adam a vision of the telos 
of human history while Eve sleeps, but this teleology is not completed in the narrative. Instead, 
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the poem leaves Adam and Eve walking through Eden, ejected from Paradise, beginning their 
venture at making human history while awaiting promised redemption:  
They, looking back, all th’ eastern side beheld 
Of Paradise, so late their happy seat,  
Waved over by that flaming brand.  The gate 
With dreadful faces thronged and fiery arms. 
Some natural tears they dropped but wiped them soon. 
The world was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide. 
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow  
Through Eden took their solitary way. (XII. 641-9)  
This passage offers a figure of hope—lovers hand in hand looking to eastern flames, like the 
rising sun, free to choose as they please in this new history opening out before them.  Yet, it also 
lends itself to a darker interpretation—looking backwards towards Paradise, the eastern sky is 
not illumined by the rising sun but by flaming swords blocking return to Paradise.  Turning 
toward the west, gloom overcomes Adam and Eve—they now must begin their march toward the 
west, traversing the path that just might eventually lead them back to Him.  Our parents are left 
the consolation of Milton’s “paradise within” and Christian love (caritas):  
…Hope no higher, though all the stars  
Thou knew’st by name and all th’ ethereal powers,  
All secrets of the deep, all nature’s works  
Or works of God in Heav’n, air, earth, or sea, 
And all the riches of this world enjoy’dst 
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And all the rule, one empire.  Only add 
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith,  
Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,  
By name to come called charity, the soul 
Of all the rest.  Then wilt thou not be loath  
To leave this Paradise but shalt possess 
A paradise within thee, happier far.  (XII.576-87) 
The redemptive narrative of history through Christ, which Michael reveals to Adam, and 
acceptance of Milton’s providential argument form this paradise within.   
Looking at the arc of these narratives it is apparent that they share a trajectory —they also 
have mutual cause.  Satan and Eve are the agents of the dual narrative—made aware of 
themselves as Others by their inequality and relationality to God and Adam.  They must 
transgress if they wish to become autopoetic subjects within divine unity. Satan experiences this 
dilemma as a spirit in Heaven.  Seeing himself subordinated to the monarchy of the Lord, Satan 
covets his sovereignty over the corporeal and divine realms—His position as Creator.  Because 
of this, he gives birth to all evil.  Sin springs from his head full-formed and he fathers Death with 
her.  Unable to effect victory in the battle in Heaven and banished thereupon, Satan finds solace 
in his new dominion of Hell with his demonic army and progeny —for he believes he can now 
possess this new realm as ‘Sov’reign’ (I. 246).  He speaks reverently of his new dominion:   
          …Farewell happy fields 
 Where joy forever dwells! Hail horrors, hail 
 Infernal World! And thou, profoundest Hell, 
 Receive thy new possessor, one who brings  
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 A mind not to be changed by place or time! 
 The mind is its own place and in itself  
 Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven. (I. 249-55) 
Satan cannot truly create anything in the spiritual realm.  Pandemonium is an illusion.  Sin and 
Death are fated to be vanquished by Christ.  He can, however, contend with God’s design on the 
corporeal realm through his temptation of Eve.  They affect change in the material world by 
offending against God’s design, causing the loss of the Garden—an act of decreation.  This 
decreative act brings Sin, Death, human history and Christ into the world—only creation within a 
larger totality, and only creation by destruction. 
Eve’s subjection has double valence—she is also second to Adam, the corporeal 
sovereign of her realm.  ‘A Voice’ admonishes Eve, after she has interacted with her own 
reflection with pleasure just after her birth:   
…He  
Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy  
Inseparably thine. To him shalt bear  
Multitudes like thyself and thence be called  
Mother of human race. (IV. 471-5)   
In this poem, the voice of God himself defines Eve’s human being through her reproductive 
capacity. Eve is part of the larger unities of Adam, God, and salvation history, while she desires 
the ability to make herself.  Satan tempts Eve to disobey by this desire for autopoetic agency—
she desires to will her own existence within corporeal reality.  Like Satan, she is subordinate to 
the divine sovereign of everything.  Eve praises the creative power of the forbidden fruit—new 
knowledge and the ability to articulate it.  
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…best of fruits,  
Though kept from Man, and worthy to be admired,  
whose taste too long forborne at first assay  
Gave elocution to the mute and taught 
The tongue not made for speech to speak thy praise. (IX. 745-9) 
Yet by disobeying God and eating of the Tree, Eve “Brought death into the world and all our 
woe” (I.3), ending her unity with God in Paradise, receiving the burden of generation and 
becoming the mother of the species.  While, in fact, Eve’s disobedience is what creates the 
“paradise within” by denying humanity Paradise, this subjectivity through new knowledge can 
resemble Hell more than Paradise. Even before the historical introduction of suffering into the 
world (by Sin and Death) with Adam and Eve’s expulsion from the garden, Eve is in despair and 
contemplates suicide:  “Then, both ourselves and seed at once to free / From what we fear for 
both, let us make short, / Let us seek Death, or, he not found, supply / With our own hands his 
office on ourselves.” (X.999-1002).  Her situation is tragic like Dido’s but her way is more 
complicated.  She is compelled to mother humanity and cannot therefore take the same way as 
the Aeneid’s tragic queen. 
In her creation of the loss of Paradise, Eve becomes the mother of the historical human 
and a later daughter of hers will give birth to Christ, the subject of salvation history.  Christ is the 
only reason she can endure.  Adam reminds her of “Part of our sentence, that thy Seed shall 
bruise / The serpent’s head...” (X.1031-2), drawing her away from her anti-reproductive and 
suicidal thoughts (X.973-1006). The narrative closes with Adam and Eve at the start of their 
journey as historical humans, progressing back to God by passing time in a world of suffering 
and death until Christ’s redemption.  Having fallen from unity with the divine by asserting the 
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ability to do otherwise—disobeying God by their divinely-given freedom of will—the pair enters 
historical-material reality, Eden’s country beyond the borders of Paradise.  Ripped from oneness 
with the divine, their way is ‘solitary.’ Paradise Lost offers several notions of collectivity:  
spiritual unity with all things in and under God outside of temporal and corporeal existence, a 
life of reverence and obedience with God and angels in the Garden, or a man and a woman hand 
in hand in history.  Companionate marriage is the model of the relationship from human to 
human as they work in bounds toward the teleological end of their history, redemption and 
unification with the Lord—back to the beginning.    
Now, the couple may begin the progress of history, reproductive work—the reunification 
with God through Eve’s generation of God incarnate as man.  This mythic history begins with 
Satan and ends with Christ, bookended by unity with the divine outside of historical and 
narrative time.  Generation, then, is the material of human history.  Eve’s curse resonates with 
Milton’s horrific rendering of fecund Sin:   
 These yelling monsters that with ceaseless cry  
 Surround me as thou saw’st, hourly conceived 
 And hourly born with sorrow infinite  
 To me.  For when they list, into the womb 
 That bred them they return and howl and gnaw 
 My bowels, their repast, then bursting forth 
 Afresh with conscious terrors vex me round  
 That rest or intermission none I find. (II. 795-802) 
Like Sin’s ‘yelling monsters’ born from and immediately returning to the womb, Eve’s 
generation is not truly creative.  It is her necessary burden to resist Death in the world, awaiting 
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Christ’s advent.  In the mythic framework of Paradise Lost the meaning of the material world 
exists only relationally to the teleology of loss of and return to Paradise.  Human history will end 
in Christ’s second coming, when He will dissolve the material world, end human history and 
return the faithful to the Creator’s womb:  
 When this world’s dissolution shall be ripe 
 With glory and pow’r to judge both quick and dead:   
 To judge th’ unfaithful dead but to reward 
 His faithful and receive them into bliss, 
 Whether in Heav’n or Earth, for then the Earth 
 Shall all be Paradise, far happier place 
 Than this of Eden, and far happier days. (XII. 459-65) 
All creative acts in the poem’s narrative are accomplished either completely without mothers or 
by incestuous coupling.  While Satan and Eve are the agents of their own falls, their freedom is 
Christian negative freedom—an ultimately unsuccessful resistant agency within the ineluctable 
teleology of divine unity. The poem endows God, Christ, and Adam with prophetic power to 
envision this myth about history.  All that is left to Eve beyond the generation of Christian 
history is unfaith, damnation and the night world of dream—like Satan’s phantom realm in the 
deep.    
Virginia Woolf metaphorizes the effect of the myth—Paradise Lost suggests a ‘large and 
imposing figure of a gentleman’ for her ‘perpetual adoration’ rather than a view of the ‘open 
sky.’ In her closing words of A Room of One’s Own she envisions the moment of the deposition 
of this gentleman, ‘Milton’s bogey:’ 
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my belief is that if we live another century or so—I am talking of the common life which 
is the real life and not of the little separate lives which we live as individuals—and have 
five hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of freedom and 
the courage to write exactly what we think; if we escape a little from the common sitting-
room and see human beings not always in their relation to each other but in relation to 
reality; and the sky, too, and the trees or whatever it may be in themselves; if we look 
past Milton's bogey, for no human being should shut out the view; if we face the fact, for 
it is a fact, that there is no arm to cling to, but that we go alone and that our relation is to 
the world of reality and not only to the world of men and women, then the opportunity 
will come and the dead poet who was Shakespeare's sister will put on the body which she 
has so often laid down. (114)    
Woolf renders Milton’s bogey ambiguously, a gentleman and a terrible spirit —not quite Adam, 
Satan or God.  Instead the bogey is the embodiment of the sacred power of Milton’s poetry—the 
taboos and sanctions for new myths and ties on the tongues of later writers.   In The Madwoman 
in the Attic Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar expand Woolf’s analysis, defining the effect of 
Milton’s myth on 19
th
 Century women writers:   
The story that Milton, ‘the first of the masculinists,’ most notably tells to women is of 
course the story of woman’s secondness, her otherness, and how that otherness leads 
inexorably to her demonic anger, her sin, her fall, and her exclusion from that garden of 
the gods which is also, for her, the garden of poetry. (191) 
Like the voice that taught Eve of her secondness in the Garden, Milton’s voice instructs women 
of the vanity of their creation.  Neither history nor poetry is open to them.  Women have no 
capability to craft the world—that ability is reserved for God and his men, Adam, Christ and the 
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apologetic poet.  Reading Paradise Lost like these feminist critics, we are invited to turn away 
from Milton’s bogey, telling women of their necessary secondness, in the same way we turned 
away from Aeneas with Dido. We are invited to think of new narratives that will open up new 
possibilities for the paradise within.  
Milton’s narrative of humanity and history, or How do we read Frankenstein’s monster? 
Human history and poetry (and the paradise within) are the grounds of contestation in 
Frankenstein. Certainly Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley shared her mother’s contrary intelligence, 
studying her works obsessively.  Mary Wollstonecraft—feminist philosopher and mother of 
Mary Shelley, who died by her birth— wrote of Milton in her 1792 A Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman: 
Similar feelings [to what we feel when children are playing or animals sporting] has 
Milton’s pleasing picture of paradisiacal happiness ever raised in my mind, yet, instead of 
envying the lovely pair, I have, with conscious dignity, or Satanic pride, turned to hell for 
sublimer objects. In the same style, when viewing some noble monument of human art, I 
have traced the emanation of the Deity in the order I admired, till, descending from that 
giddy height, I have caught myself contemplating the grandest of all human sights, for 
fancy quickly placed, in some solitary recess, an outcast of fortune, rising superior to 
passion and discontent. (II. Note 2) 
Here, Wollstonecraft confesses her romantic (mis)reading of Milton.  Feeling that the lovers’ 
condition in Milton’s Paradise—with its emanation of the Deity—offends her sense of her place 
within humanity, she identifies with the demonic.  She contemplates Milton’s rendering of the 
sublime epic warrior Satan, rising to blaspheme in passion and discontent—his pride elevating 
him to claim divine power to make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.  Wollstonecraft is of a 
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similar mind to Satan, and turns her mind to the sublimer objects of the phantom world.  She 
takes pride in Eve’s dominion in the poetic realm of Night, and claims its creative power.   
In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley turns out these ‘sublimer objects’ with her pen. Like her 
mother, Shelley was a heretical reader of Paradise Lost, and investigating her work as a 
(mis)reading of the poem will shed light on how the novel contests Milton’s history and 
definition of the human through its poetry.  Gilbert and Gubar make the following argument in 
their chapter on this novel:   
Following the rise of Romanticism with its simultaneous canonization of Milton and 
Satan, women writers have been undeniably Milton’s daughters… [They have had] on 
the one hand the option of apparently docile submission to male myths, of being ‘proud 
to minister to such a father,’ and on the other hand the option of secret study aimed 
toward the achievement of equality…these alternative patterns describe the main critical 
responses nineteenth- and twentieth- century women writers have made specifically to 
their readings, or misreadings, of Paradise Lost.  We shall argue here that the first 
alternative is the one Mary Shelley chooses in Frankenstein:  to take the male culture 
myth of Paradise Lost at its full value—on its own terms, including all the analogies and 
parallels it implies—and rewrite it so as to clarify its meaning. (220)  
Like Satan, Shelley blasphemes.  An aborted foundation myth, the poetry of Frankenstein is the 
poetry of horror, a revision of Milton that clarifies the violent implications of this unitary 
masculinist myth.   
Beginning in the novel’s frame narrative of Robert Walton’s epistles written from St. 
Petersburg and Archangel, the mood is heightened with the cold northern ‘wind of promise’ 
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inspiring Walton northwards with ‘fervent and vivid’ daydreams (1). The explorer’s expectations 
for this new land are nothing short of untold beauty, wonder and knowledge.    
There snow and frost are banished; and, sailing over a calm sea, we may be wafted to a 
land surpassing in wonders and in beauty every region hitherto discovered on the 
habitable globe.  Its productions and features may be without example…What may not be 
expected in a country of eternal light?  I may there discover the wondrous power which 
attracts the needle and may regulate a thousand celestial observations that require only 
this voyage to render their seeming eccentricities consistent forever.  I shall satiate my 
ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before visited. (1)      
Indeed Walton’s letter is prescient, but the features of this untold country are not of eternal light 
but of darkness.  Walton runs across the half-dead Frankenstein and that other traveler who 
“seemed to be, a savage inhabitant of some undiscovered island, but a European” in this sublime 
setting (9). Frankenstein is physically destroyed and in despair, the only thing that enlivens him 
again is the news that the monster may yet be alive and he might yet revenge himself.  
By introducing Frankenstein and his monster in this epistolary frame narrative after the 
whole of the action of Frankenstein’s narrative has passed, Frankenstein affords its reader 
forewarning of both characters’ horrific and tragic fates.  The frame narrative activates the 
expectation for the reader of violent destruction, death, and horror.  The epistles leave Walton in 
the same state of mind, anticipating Frankenstein’s narrative and resolving to record it.  Thus 
begins the narrative of Frankenstein’s creation, the occurrence that activates all the novel’s 
horror.  This is the novel’s first bildungsroman, representing his childhood and education in the 
classics of science—“Natural philosophy is the genius that has regulated my fate” (24).  He 
completes his education at university, where he gains the scientific knowledge that leads him to 
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the secret of life—the ability to create a human.  He muses on his discovery’s potential:  “what 
glory would attend the discovery if I could banish disease from the human frame and render man 
invulnerable to any but a violent death!” (27).  The monster is born of this monomaniacal 
obsession with scientific progress, male creation—“treading in the steps already marked, I will 
pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of 
creation” (33).  His grotesque appearance is the result of Frankenstein’s hasty imprecision and 
obsession with magnifying human power.  The student seeks the total illumination of the 
workings of nature, a unified knowledge of reality, and by this impulse he creates monstrous but 
recognizably human life.  Like the Creator of Paradise Lost, Frankenstein can foresee his 
creation’s depravity from the outset of his narrative—he is telling the story after the monster’s 
murder of Elizabeth, his final horror, and is reproducing his own horror in the narrative through 
foreshadowing.   
The bildungsroman-style narrative ends with his creative act, represented with language 
of grotesque sexual violence. Frankenstein reacts to his creation as a man, not as a God whose 
actions are self-justified—he experiences momentary orgasmic ecstasy, followed by 
overwhelming horror:   
It was on a dreary night of November that I beheld the accomplishment of my 
toils.  With an anxiety that almost amounted to agony, I collected the instruments of life 
around me, that I might infuse a spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet.  
It was already one in the morning; the rain pattered dismally against the panes, and my 
candle was nearly burnt out, when, by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw 
the dull yellow eye of a creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated 
its limbs.   
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…Beautiful! Great God! ...The different accidents of life are not so changeable as 
the feelings of human nature.  I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole 
purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body.  For this I had deprived myself of rest 
and health.  I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I 
had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled 
my heart. (42)   
Agitating life out of non-life by his scientific investigation of the workings of the natural world, 
Frankenstein authors in his monster the circumstances for his own eventual destruction.  As was 
true of Eve created from Adam’s divine rib, union of the material (an amalgam of cadaver parts 
agitated by the instruments of life) and the mythic (scientific knowledge of the causes of life and 
death) creates this monster in the womb of the laboratory.  Knowledge is the cause of the 
monster’s generation—and in this generation Frankenstein’s and his monster’s tragic fate. 
Reproducing divine creative power in deformity, Frankenstein has brought forth something 
monstrous from the beautiful unity of the natural world.  This monster is of human construction 
and his fate will be the same as his creator’s own—self-destruction through knowledge of one’s 
own secondness—Frankenstein’s to nature/God and his monster to man/myth.   
Frankenstein descends into illness and mental anguish, only returning home after he 
learns of his brother’s murder.  Following Justine’s execution for the murder, he journeys into 
the mountains in despair. Ascending Mount Blanc, “with something like joy” he exclaims 
“Wandering spirits, if indeed ye wander, and do not rest in your narrow beds, allow me this faint 
happiness, or take me, as your companion, away from the joys of life” (80).  Immediately, joy 
turns to horror as he spots his creation bounding up the mountain with superhuman speed—like 
Satan mounting Paradise—and a ‘mist’ comes over the creator’s eyes.    He addresses his 
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creation:  “Devil do you dare approach me? And do you not fear the fierce vengeance of my arm 
wreaked on your miserable head?  Begone, vile insect!” (81).  The monster recognizes that 
wretchedness has made him a demon but he exhorts his creator to claim him as his Adam:  
“Remember that I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, 
whom thou drivest for no misdeed.  Everywhere I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably 
excluded. I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend.  Make me happy, and I shall 
again be virtuous.”  Frankenstein replies:  “Begone! I will not hear you.  There can be no 
community between you and me; we are enemies.  Begone, or let us try our strength in a fight, in 
which one must fall.” (81-2). 
This ‘Adam’ has not been issued from God, but from man’s progressive, modern and 
scientific creative force.  Like Eve, he is defined by his secondness—but this Other does not 
even receive a name.  He is a monster, whose grotesquerie excludes him from human 
collectivity.  Yet issued from a human medicine and myth, Frankenstein’s monster finds 
meaning from and thus searches for solidarity with humankind.  His narrative is the novel’s 
second bildungsroman, recounting the monster’s development from his creation, through his 
education in myth and history as he educates himself in an attempt to join the family of cottagers 
he admires.  As it was for Eve in Paradise Lost, the monster’s consciousness of himself as other 
than man causes his fall.  However, he finds not joy and love in his reflection but the makings of 
horror—fear and disgust:    
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers—their grace, beauty, and delicate 
complexions; but how was I terrified when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first 
I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected back in the mirror; 
and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I was filled 
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with the bitterest sensation of despondence and mortification.  Alas!  I did not yet know 
the fatal effects of this miserable deformity. (94)  
Not only the monster’s grotesque physical form is begotten of man, the monster acquires 
language and is nourished by myth, reading among other things Paradise Lost and the diary of 
Frankenstein documenting the horrific mode of the monster’s own birth. In myth the monster 
finds only confirmation of his depravity.  He should be human, but he cannot be:  “Increase of 
knowledge only discovered to me more clearly what a wretched outcast I was” (111). He 
discovers that he exists beyond the myths of Christian and natural history, and thus recognizes 
himself in Satan but knows not what fault of his own has caused his fall. Frankenstein’s impulse 
to create superhuman life made his form so large and grotesque. The monster’s exclusion from 
myths of history and human collectivity is hardly his fault.  His fall was preordained by natural 
unity and is inextricably tied to Frankenstein’s own destruction—happening to run across 
William, his creator’s little brother, he smothers him trying to silence his screams.    
While a product of human scientific inquiry, the monster violates the scientific 
understanding of nature and the romantic aesthetic of natural beauty. A beautiful, explicable and 
orderly unity, the natural world affords such a grotesque and horrifically created creature no 
opportunity of belonging.  Nevertheless, the monster, educated in this collective imaginary and 
the myth of Christian salvation history, conceptualizes the hope for his redemption within these 
frameworks.  He asks Frankenstein to make him happy as God made Adam happy in Paradise, to 
create a companion for him—a monster of the second sex:    
This passion is detrimental to me, for you do not reflect that you are the cause of its 
excess…It is true that we shall be monsters, cut off from all the world; but on that 
account we shall be more attached to one another.  Our lives will not be happy, but they 
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will be harmless and free from the misery I now feel. Oh! My creator, make me happy; 
let me feel gratitude towards you for one benefit!  Let me see that I excite the sympathy 
of some existing thing; do not deny me my request! (125)  
Frankenstein is moved by the monster’s story and agrees to fulfill his entreaty for redemption.  
But fearful of creating this monstrous Eve in light of the additional violence and destruction she 
might inflict on humans, especially if this monstrous couple were to generate a race of monsters, 
he aborts his creation.  With this action, the monster’s hope for salvation dies.  This action also 
determines Frankenstein’s tragic fate—when he attains knowledge of the abortion of his Eve, the 
monster curses his creator:   
Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I can make you so 
wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you.  You are my creator, but I am your 
master; obey! ... I may die, but first you, my tyrant and tormentor, shall curse the sun that 
gazes on your misery.  Beware, for I am fearless and therefore powerful.  I will watch 
with the wiliness of a snake, that I may sting with its venom.  Man, you shall repent of 
the injuries you inflict…I shall be with you on your wedding-night. (147) 
The monster’s revenge is sharp—fulfilling his promise, he eradicates the last source of joy from 
Frankenstein’s life.  The monster’s power, like the power of Milton’s Satan and Eve, is 
decreative.  The monster laments the impotence of his violence: “For while I destroyed his 
hopes, I did not satisfy my own desires” (197).  By killing Elizabeth, he has snuffed out 
Frankenstein’s hope for happiness in the world.  Frankenstein has not only lost his beloved, his 
‘more than sister,’ but Elizabeth’s death also carries symbolic resonance.  Elizabeth’s pursuit of 
the “creation of poets” existed in harmonic companionship with Frankenstein’s scientific 
exploration of cause (22).  This final horror rends the harmony of their twin myths—the myth of 
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natural unity and scientific progress that motivated Frankenstein to creation and the myth of 
salvation history and companionate marriage that inspired his monster to destruction—and 
terminates their trajectory in horror and tragedy.   
The teleology of Frankenstein is nihilism.  There will be no salvation for the monster—
denied humanity and his Eve, even the vague hope of generational progress and salvation 
through one’s descendents is unavailable.  The frame narrative concludes with the monster’s 
final lament and promise of suicide:   
“He is dead who called me into being; and when I shall be no more, the very 
remembrance of us both will speedily vanish… The light of that conflagration will fade 
away; my ashes will be swept into the sea by the winds.  My spirit will sleep in peace, or 
if it thinks, it will not surely think thus.  Farewell.”…He was soon borne away by the 
waves and lost in darkness and distance. (197-8)  
His fate is the total destruction of his body and his spirit, he will return to the earth and the 
perpetual night of non-being and triumph in his death.  Lost in darkness and distance to Walton’s 
perception, the monster believes that his story will be lost to humanity as well—all will be 
destroyed.  Yet Frankenstein speaks the monster’s story with his own first person narration at its 
core.  Shelley gives him and his creator voice through their sole surviving witness, Walton, who 
has previous experience as a poet, of which he writes to his sister: “I also became a poet and for 
one year lived in a paradise of my own creation; I imagined that I also might obtain a niche in the 
temple where the names of Homer and Shakespeare are consecrated.  You are well acquainted 
with my failure and how heavily I bore the disappointment” (2).  Walton’s second foray into 
poetry, the main narrative of Frankenstein, is no such failure.  Frankenstein is Walton’s muse and 
he writes with an overwhelming passion to record his story—“as I commence my task, his full-
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toned voice swells in my ears” (15).  His success is Shelley’s success.  The novel contains a 
preface to the novel of dubious authorship—in it one of the Shelleys explains Wollstonecraft 
Shelley’s poetic process in Frankenstein:  
The event on which this fiction is founded has been supposed, by Dr. Darwin and some 
of the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence.  I shall not be 
supposed of according the remotest degree of serious faith to such an imagination; yet, in 
assuming it as the basis of a work of fancy, I have not considered myself as merely 
weaving a series of supernatural terrors… however impossible as a physical fact, affords 
a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions more 
comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary relations of existing events 
can yield.  I have thus endeavored to preserve the truth of the elementary principles of 
human nature, while I have not scrupled to innovate upon their combinations.  The Iliad, 
the tragic poetry of Greece, Shakespeare in the Tempest and Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
and most especially Milton in Paradise Lost conform to this rule. (xxvii) 
Rooted in biological knowledge and speculation of the time, Shelley’s words represent a possible 
reality that could have been actual.  Yet, even if the occurrences of her plot are impossible in 
fact, the novel represents a truth about human nature.  Desiring to belong with his creator—with 
human kind—the monster amalgamates Milton’s Satan and Eve.  Defined by his otherness in 
relation to the natural world and society’s mythic collective imaginary, Frankenstein’s monster’s 
narrative successfully renders the horror of what is left to the Other within this justification of 
human history’s place within divine unity.  While this Romantic novel does not linger over the 
nuances of social reality, the horror of Frankenstein clarifies the darker meaning of Milton’s 
poem for the human collectivity.   
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Shelley represents the logical conclusion of the agency of resistance and decreative acts 
of Milton’s Satan and Eve—the death of innocents, an unreachable desire to be reunited with the 
creator, and the failed model of collectivity that is companionate marriage or the biological 
family. The novel aborts the destructive potential of the monster’s species with the monstrous 
Eve and the monster expects his story to die with him, yet his narrative is articulated by the 
creative act of a woman.  Unable to envision himself or his kind within a new model of 
collectivity, the monster disappears into the darkness where he most certainly will not find a way 
to return to the Garden but where he may not find trees for his funeral pyre on the arctic ice-
sheets either.  The monster not only exists outside of salvation history, but his unnatural form 
also excludes him from Milton’s human history—the generational history of births and deaths.  
Suicide is his last option for a triumphant end, a last imposition of individual destructive power 
over reality.  Certainly he has destroyed Frankenstein and all he held dear, and the narrative 
leaves the monster in despair—but this last destruction is not represented but only foreshadowed 
by the narrative.  The final horror of Frankenstein is that it leaves the monster wandering the 
dark world—Shelley does not represent the monster’s death.  Instead, she leaves open the 
potential that he might come to us as he did to Frankenstein on Mt. Blanc—at once a human and 
a monster, our doppelganger with uncanny timing reminding us of our own desires for the 
sublimer objects of hell.  Frankenstein does not return its world back to the state of nature before 
Frankenstein’s creation; instead it leaves Frankenstein’s monster as a spirit wandering—haunting 
Milton’s salvation history and an Enlightenment view of nature.    
The monster’s story, with the exception of his final despair in the concluding epistles and 
his last journey on the ice, is focused through Frankenstein’s recollection.  The monster’s genesis 
is outside of the world of possibility given in Milton’s account of history and its horror is the 
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clear result of human creation.  But his telos is beyond the narrative—the novel does not 
actualize the potential for ultimate horror in a race of monsters and the monster’s demise is 
beyond the time of narration.  Instead of offering finality and wholeness, the monster’s history is 
open-ended. The narrative however achieves closure—leaving the monster in darkness, Walton 
cannot perceive what might happen beyond that moment and Shelley does not continue her 
novel.  The novel leaves the monster suicide as his sole option, with the possibility of marriage 
and total destruction through monstrous generation gone.  Frankenstein does not bury the 
monster, yet at the same time it cannot imagine what would happen if it did not—the monster 
cannot achieve a fate beyond the fate Milton’s God left humankind, death and generation.  Still 
he creates something that Milton did not imagine—the poetry of the fallen, of the Other.  He 
justifies his own place in reality through telling the story of his own creation, like Milton.  
However, his account is not an apology but a lamentation.  As the monster’s story lies at the 
center of Frankenstein, his creative act is the embodiment of the potential of women’s poetry as a 
legitimate act of resistance against Milton’s order.  However, this nascent literature will remain 
as Frankenstein’s monster, with its creative potential arrested, until the collective imaginary 
shakes its view free from Milton’s impeding bogey.    
In telling a story that is both within and in tension with the human—specifically a 
definition of the human informed by Enlightenment science and Miltonic myth—Frankenstein 
imagines what could have happened (the generation of a species of human monsters) as a horror 
story if it would have happened (the deaths of William, Justine, Elizabeth, etc.).  Frankenstein, as 
a myth combining natural objects into the strange and supernatural, figures Milton’s bogey in the 
monster and his creative destruction.  In a way he is a figure of hope, for the monster was not 
fated to horrific violence—he once loved living and demonstrated a remarkable humanness for 
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an unnamed monster—only driven to it by his exclusion from human meaning and collectivity.  
Still, the monster cannot ultimately make a life for himself and a place within the human 
collectivity.  Victor Frankenstein and Frankenstein ultimately abort their monster’s possible 
foundation myth, that generation of a species of monsters that can contest the unified order of 
nature and the hegemonic notion of human collectivity. In this aborted foundation myth, we see 
the beginnings of a collective imaginary that seeks to call into question previous definitions of 
the human and we see the origins of the poetics of science fiction.   
The cyborg narrative of humanity and history, or How do we read Orlando, Woman on the 
Edge of Time and The Female Man? 
Proceeding from my analysis of Frankenstein, I will analyze three classics of science 
fiction—Virginia Woolf’s Orlando (a sort of foundation myth of queerness, projected into the 
past), Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (a foundation myth rooted in the 
contemporary political moment), and Joanna Russ’s The Female Man (an ambiguous utopia and 
foundation myth projected into the future). Each of these novels imagines a narrative of 
humanity beyond the constraints of death and generation and marks the movement of women’s 
literature to that 20
th
 century project of a ‘secret study’ aimed at the achievement of equality and 
toward a cyborg mythos committed to “partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity”.  This work is 
the work of constructing new narratives and new worlds.  Joanna Russ describes this feminist 
poetics of SF in To Write Like a Woman:  Essays in Feminism and Science Fiction, employing 
Samuel Delany’s rendering of the subjunctivity of narrative as her definition of the generic 
process of science fiction: 
Subjunctivity is the tension on the thread of meaning that runs between word and object.  
[For] a piece of reportage, a blanket indicative tension informs the whole series:  this 
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happened… The subjunctivity for a series of words labeled naturalistic fiction is defined 
by:  could have happened.... [In] SF the subjunctivity level is changed once more… have 
not happened. (16) 
Orlando 
Written as a literary biography, Virginia Woolf’s Orlando combines the fantastical and 
the historical to represent its subject—the life of Orlando, who began life as a boy in Elizabethan 
England and is a woman when the novel closes at “the twelfth stroke of midnight, Thursday, the 
eleventh of October, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight” (241). Orlando is indeed a science 
fiction novel, representing something that had not happened in 1928 (i.e. the metamorphosis of 
an individual’s sex), but it is stylized as a piece of biographical reportage. Other critics have 
dealt well with how the narrative of Orlando necessitates the sex-change of its subject.  The sex 
change is necessary in order for Orlando to maintain a self same identity as a poet and for Woolf 
to overcome impediments in the genre of biography:  
Woolf’s protagonist is male until the close of the seventeenth century not merely because 
Orlando’s sex-change marks “the entrance of women into the literary marketplace,” as 
Gilbert and Gubar have suggested (39); another reason is that like the details of Judith 
Shakespeare’s life and the details of women’s lives in patrilineal societies generally, 
those of Vita Sackville-West’s female ancestors were left unrecorded. (Boehm 195) 
Across the centuries and pages of the novel, we can read the historical development of the sexes 
in its fantastical-biographical account of Orlando.  In this way, Woolf turns what seems to be the 
historical and biographical limitations of women’s secondness into the free fantasy of an 
individual who can be both a man and a woman.   
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Fragments of identity, narrative, and time form the self-same Orlando whose queerness is 
represented not only in the content of the narrative but also in its language. Woolf overgoes the 
queerness of language used on the occasion of Orlando’s metamorphosis—“we have no choice 
left but confess—he was a woman” (102)— with her first confession of love as a woman 
“‘You’re a woman, Shel!” she cried.  ‘You’re a man, Orlando!’ he cried” (184).  Most 
startlingly, Orlando once again outdoes itself in the final pages of the novel with Orlando’s 
reflection on “the Captain self” or the “Key self” (227) While the biographer asserts that some 
selves “are too wildly ridiculous to be mentioned in print at all,” Woolf gives us a long and 
wildly contradictory list of the selves that form Orlando’s identity:  
For she had a great variety of selves to call upon, far more than we have been able to 
find room for, since a biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or 
seven selves, wheras a person may well have as many thousand.  Choosing then, only 
those selves we have found room for, Orlando may now have called on the boy who cut 
the nigger’s head down…or she may have called upon the young man who fell in love 
with Sasha; or upon the Courtier; or upon the Ambassador; or upon the Soldier; or upon 
the Traveller; she may have wanted the woman to come to her; the Gipsy; the Fine Lady; 
the Hermit; the girl in love with life; the Patroness of Letters; the woman who called Mar 
(meaning hot baths and evening fires) or Shelmerdine (meaning crocuses in autumn 
woods) or Bonthrop (meaning the death we die daily) the woman or all three together—
which meant more things than we have space to write out—all these selves were different 
and she may have called upon any one of them” (226). 
Orlando’s biographer can hold all of these fragments of Orlando’s identity together in unity—
from that most barbaric Orlando, whose “fathers had been noble since they had been at all” and 
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who “cut the nigger’s head down,” (12, 226) to that Orlando who can love so variously that 
syntax breaks down, and there is not space to write out her life in its full possibility.     
Orlando’s multiplicity of selves has been the delight of her biographer and part of 
Orlando’s character since boyhood, figured first in an image of Orlando standing in the 
variegated light made by the family coat of arms:  
Orlando stood now in the midst of the yellow body of an heraldic leopard.  When he put 
his hand on the window-sill to push the window open, it was instantly coloured red, blue, 
and yellow like a butterfly’s wing.  Thus, those who like symbols, and have a turn for the 
deciphering of them, might observe that though the shapely legs, the handsome body, and 
the well-set shoulders were all of them decorated with various tints of heraldic light, 
Orlando’s face, as he threw the window open, was lit solely by the sun itself…Happy the 
mother who bears, happier still the biographer who records the life of such a one!  Never 
need she vex herself, nor he invoke the help of novelist or poet.  From deed to deed, from 
glory to glory, from office to office he must go, his scribe following after till they reach 
what ever seat it may be that is the height of their desire. (12) 
Orlando does not always experience this multiplicity of selves with the same delight as the 
biographer.  As a young man, upon seeing his first great love Sasha, the Orlando who loves men 
vexes him:  “When the boy, for alas, a boy it must be—no woman could skate with such speed 
and vigour—swept almost on tiptoe past him, Orlando was ready to tear his hair with vexation 
that the person was of his own sex, and thus all embraces were out of the question” (28).  As a 
recently transformed woman, the Orlando who loves women haunts her.  Launching directly into 
the subject of chastity, Orlando’s biographer obverses that the beginnings of her sexual life as a 
woman were “of a very complicated kind.” Orlando’s anxiety here is similar to her anxiety upon 
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meeting Sasha—she is vexed by another self—this time one who loves women.  “If one has been 
a man for thirty years or so…if one has held a Queen in one’s arms and one or two other ladies, 
if report be true, of less exalted rank, if one has married a Rosina Pepita, and so on, one does not 
give such a very great start about that [chastity]” (113-4). She feels herself to be unchaste and 
dishonored for the very first time and, thinking of her earlier love for Sasha, experiences the 
anxiety of womanhood: “…if it meant conventionality, meant slavery, meant deceit, meant 
denying her love, fettering her limbs, pursing her lips, and restraining her tongue, then she would 
turn about with the ship and set sail once more for the gipsies” (121).  Orlando and I reject the 
notion that Orlando’s becoming a woman demonstrates fallen-ness necessarily, but Orlando does 
experience a feeling of fallen-ness following her metamorphosis.  
 Orlando’s most anxious moment about her identity occurs immediately after the narrator 
asserts her ability to call upon any of her thousand selves. Orlando, smelling a candle in a shop 
that recalls her violently and instantly to her erotic feelings for Sasha, is frantic as she drives 
away. While she, like the biographer, eventually comes to realize that this desire can fit into what 
the biographer names “the Captain self” or “the Key self” (227), Orlando’s understanding of her 
situation is strikingly different in tone from the biographer’s calm, cataloguing one: 
“Haunted!”  she cried, suddenly pressing the accelerator.  “Haunted! ever since I was a 
child.  There flies the wild goose.  It flies past the window out to sea.  Up I jumped (she 
gripped the steering wheel tighter) and stretched after it.  But the goose flies too fast.  
I’ve seen it here—there—there…Always it flies fast out to sea and always I fling after it 
words like nets (here she flung her hand out) which shrivel as I’ve seen nets shrivel 
drawn on deck with only sea-weed in them.  And sometimes there’s an inch of silver—
six words—in the bottom of the net.  But never the great fish who lives in the coral 
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groves.”…And it was at this moment, when she had ceased to call “Orlando” and was 
deep in thoughts of something else that the Orlando whom she had called came of its own 
accord…So she was now darkened, stilled, and become, with the addition of this 
Orlando, what is called, rightly or wrongly, a single self, a real self. (229-30)  
When Orlando ceases to call for herself, ceases the frenzy of searching for unity, she finds a 
single and real identity.  While she can only grasp an inch of silver or six words, rather than her 
desired great fish, Orlando’s selves in all their queerness coalesce.  Possibility flashes, and for an 
instant Orlando’s narrative is whole.  But before the novel’s completion “the present shower[s] 
down upon her head once more” and she sees the goose once again (239). Orlando leaves her at 
the narrative present, the moment of its composition, and her reunion with her husband, shaking 
the novel out of final unity.  Orlando cries out ecstatically when she sights the goose, and the 
ellipsis in her final words imitate her unfulfilled flight after the object of her desire, :  “‘It is the 
goose!’  Orlando cried. ‘The wild goose…’” (241).     
Woman on the Edge of Time 
 Marge Piercy’s novel, operating in three parallel worlds, tells the story of Consuela 
Ramos (Connie) as a potential foundation myth for a future utopia, Mattapoisett. The novel 
opens with the two most important features of Connie’s situation, her dubious sanity and the 
violence that she experiences:  “Connie got up from her kitchen table and walked slowly to the 
door. Either I saw him or I didn’t and I’m crazy for real this time, she thought.  ‘It’s me—Dolly!’ 
Her niece was screaming in the hall…Blood was oozing from Dolly’s bruised mouth…” (3).  
The first event of the novel—Connie’s failed attempt to save her niece from her abusive pimp of 
a boyfriend and a forced abortion—establishes the reader’s empathy with Connie for her selfless 
act while simultaneously pushing Connie into the margins of society and humane treatment, 
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those institutionalized against their own will.  In the course of these opening pages, the reader 
learns that Connie has had a history of institutionalization after an ambiguous but violent episode 
with her daughter.  Falling victim to the pimp’s abuse and lies herself, we experience Connie’s 
institutionalization as a wrong even though the content of her sanity is unknowable in the novel:  
“Dolly had heard her talking with Luciente:  therefore he existed.  Or Dolly had heard her talking 
to herself.  Dolly had said the chair was warm:  she had been sitting in the other chair in front of 
the plate from her supper of eggs and beans.  She must not think about it now, with Dolly 
suffering.  His story was unbelievable!  No, don’t think about it.” (4).  
Through the story of Connie’s conversations with Luciente in our world and her eventual 
visits to Luciente’s parallel world, Mattapoisett, we learn that Luciente is not in fact a man but an 
androgynous woman existing in a distant possible future where gender differs so much that 
Connie cannot read her (it would be per in Mattapoisett, the oblique case of their only pronoun, 
person) properly.   
 “Much I don’t comprehend that led to us,” Luciente said gently, arm around her 
waist as they bumped downhill.  “But not inevitably, grasp?  Those of your time who 
fought hard for change, often they had myths that a revolution was inevitable.  But 
nothing is!  All things interlock.  We are only one possible future.  Do you grasp?”  
 … “But you exist.” She [Connie] tried to laugh.  “So it all worked out.”  
 “Maybe.  Yours is a crux-time.  Alternate universes coexist.  Probabilities clash 
and possibilities wink out forever.”…”You’re learning, how not?” Luciente stooped to 
peer into her face.  “Our ancestor.” (169-70) 
Living at a crux-time in history, Connie will determine the possibility of a future that exists 
beyond and as an alternative to the violence of her present situation—this future is not an 
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inevitable end of a unified history.  Probabilities and worlds fracture and a utopian future is one 
that Connie and other ancestors of Mattapoisett must work toward, especially at crux-times.   
Through her relationship to two possible future worlds, Luciente’s Mattapoisett and 
Gildina’s dystopia (a possible future dystopia where the values of capitalism have taken over so 
completely that women live either as temporarily contracted sex workers or in a social position 
called “moms” who are “cored to make babies all the time” (281)) Connie enters the sphere of 
action.  In order to make Luciente’s utopian Mattapoisett possible, Connie must resist the 
experimental brain implant that the doctors at her institution see as a cure for her insanity, which 
will make her an “experimental monster:”   
She was the experiment.  They would rape her body, her brain, her self.  After this she 
could not trust her own feelings.  She would not be her own.  She would be their 
experimental monster.  Their plaything…She did not want to pass over to Mattapoisett 
tonight; she wanted to taste the last dregs of her identity before they took it from 
her…Whoever owned this place, these cities, whoever owned those glittering glassy 
office buildings in midtown filled with the purr of money turning over…they gave 
nothing back.  They took and took and left their garbage choking the air, the river, the sea 
itself.  Choking her.  A life of garbage.  Human garbage.  She had too little of what her 
body needed and too little of what her soul could imagine.  She had been able to do little 
in the years of her life, and that little had been ill paid or punished.  The rest was garbage. 
(270-1) 
Like Frankenstein’s monster, Connie has been denied her position in the human collectivity and, 
while she too could have been otherwise, turns to violence.  Using the opportunity of a 
temporary release from her institution, Connie arms herself with the poison that will be the last 
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option left to her to try to save herself and Mattapoisett. In a lament one could imagine in the 
mouth of Frankenstein’s monster, Connie begins to resolve herself to kill: “‘If only they had left 
me something!’ she whispered.  Still trembling, she thought…Only one person to love.  Just one 
little corner of loving of my own.  For that love I’d have borne it all and I’d never have fought 
back.  I would have obeyed….But you were so greedy, so cruel!  One of them, just one, you 
could have left me!  But I have nothing. Why shouldn’t I strike back?” (271, emphasis my own).   
Implicating the reader in the violence and isolation that had led her to this last desperate 
act, Woman on the Edge of Time makes us come face to face with the inhumanity of our present, 
which makes Connie’s life unlivable without resorting to violence and constitutes what could 
prevent Mattapoisett from being an actual future.  The novel concludes ambiguously, we cannot 
know whether Connie’s actions have secured a utopian future for our world.  After she kills, 
Connie cannot reach over to Mattapoisett and Luciente:  “She thought of Luciente, but she could 
no longer reach over.  She could no longer catch.  She had annealed her mind and she was not a 
receptive woman.  She had hardened.  But she thought of Mattapoisett….for you who will be 
born from my best hopes, to you I dedicate my act of war.  At least once I fought and won” 
(364).  While Woman on the Edge of Time refuses to endorse Connie’s violence as a just act, 
refuses to make an unambiguous conclusion on her sanity, and refuses a unified narrative of its 
three worlds, the novel serves as a call to action. Woman on the Edge of Time in no way 
guarantees the existence of Mattapoisett—utopia is not inevitable. The work toward Mattapoisett 
is coterminous with the effort to make Connie’s life and lives like hers livable.  Even if we are to 
reject Mattapoisett, or even utopia, as fantasy and interpret Connie’s narrative as wholly the 
product of her mental instability, with the stakes of her story being no more than the lives of a 
few doctors, this call to action is significant.  Concluding with a chapter entitled “Excerpts from 
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the Official History of Consuelo Camacho Ramos,” the novel reveals Connie’s diagnosis for the 
first time—schizophrenia.  Leaving open the possibility that the parallel worlds of Woman on the 
Edge of Time are simply the product of an extended psychotic episode, the call to action is not 
muted—at the very least, in its clinical summary which cannot capture the depth of Connie’s 
character, intellect and emotion, the novel calls for new narratives of the human that give 
Consuelo Ramos her full due.   
The Female Man 
The Female Man’s monster is a cyborg—she is both the apocalyptic telos of the 
masculinist myth of woman’s secondness and the utopia that lies beyond that ‘end.’ This highly 
de-focalized narrative represents four characters that occupy four distinct worlds.  The main 
narrator, the “femaleman” Joanna, occupies our present—her subjectivity is a product of our 
material history.  Narrative time, however, passes in the parallel universe of Jeannine.  As the 
only character whose narrative is in the third person, Jeannine lives in a parallel present still 
stagnating in the Great Depression where neither WWII nor the women’s liberation movement 
occurred. Janet, a second first person narrator and citizen of a utopia from another future, and 
Joanna converge upon Jeannine’s world.  On one level of reading, this novel describes 
Jeannine’s development as a subject, becoming a narrative voice in the first person—a 
consciousness raising through her interactions with these other women.  Still these women’s 
fractured narrated subjectivities and temporalities connect more completely when the third first 
person narrator Jael—a comparative ethnologist/terrorist from a future dystopia where men and 
women live in separate societies engaged in a perpetual violent struggle—contacts the three 
other women and explains the relationship between the four women and their worlds.  
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Before Jael imparts her knowledge, Joanna first represents the relationship between these 
parallel realities following the introduction of Jeannine and Janet’s worlds.  Joanna negotiates the 
existence of our present, a present world with different material conditions than our own, and the 
future utopia Whileaway with an explanation of a fecund reality of infinite multiplicity.  This 
explanation of the scientific understanding of the text underlies the technology that moves the 
plot of this novel, a device that teleports instantly between space-times in alternate worlds of 
possibility:      
Every choice begets at least two worlds of possibility…To carry this line of argument 
further, there must be an infinite number of possible universes (such is the fecundity of 
God) for there is no reason to imagine Nature as prejudiced in favor of human 
action…It’s possible, too, that there is no such thing as one clear line or strand of 
probability, and that we live on a sort of twisted braid…Thus it is probable that 
Whileaway—a name for the Earth ten centuries from now, but not our Earth, if you 
follow me—will find itself not at all affected by this sortie into somebody else’s past.  
And vice versa, of course.  The two might as well be independent worlds.  Whileaway, 
you may gather, is in the future.  But not our future.  (6-7) 
These independent worlds exist in different universes with distinct temporalities.  Joanna’s 
account, then, leaves us wondering how these three temporalities can collide in Jeannine’s 
present reality and create the narrative.  If Janet’s adventure into someone else’s past cannot 
causally affect her world, then what is the content of the plot?  Can the future causally affect our 
present, or a present? Such uncertainties proliferate when Jael’s voice enters the text in the first 
chapter of Part II.  How does a character that has not yet entered Jeanine’s world find narrative 
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voice in the text?  How can she exist in relation to these women if she is indeed from another 
world?     
Who am I?  I know who I am, but what’s my brand name?  Me with a new face, a puffy 
mask.  Laid over the old one in strips of plastic, a blond Hallowe’en ghoul on top of the 
S.S. uniform.  I was a skinny beanpole underneath except for the hands, which were 
similarly treated, and that very impressive face.  I did this once in my line of business, 
which I’ll go into later and scared the idealistic children who lived downstairs.  Their 
delicate skins red with offended horror.  Their clear young voices raised in song (at three 
in the morning).  I’m not Jeannine.  I’m not Janet.  I’m not Joanna…You’ll meet me later. 
(19)  
Jael has knowledge of the three other women before she has interacted with them in the 
narrative—she can offer the knowledge of how their four temporalities are braided together.  For 
now we only know Jael as a ghoul that haunts multiple worlds. We will learn later that she is a 
militant anthropologist from a highly technologized dystopian future on a personal mission to 
gain knowledge of her ‘brand name’ as well as a political mission that horrifies ‘idealistic 
children.’  Jael reveals to the others that they are four embodiments of the same genotype in four 
distinct universes and hints at the causal relationship between their four worlds: 
The three of you got together and I pulled you all in.  Look at yourselves. Genetic 
patterns sometimes repeat themselves from possible present universe to possible present 
universe; this is also one of the elements that can vary between universes.  There is 
repetition of genotypes in the far future too, sometimes.  Here is Janet from the far future, 
but not my future or yours; here are the two of you from almost the same moment of time 
(but not as you see it!), both of those moments only a little behind mine; yet I won’t 
 51 
happen in the world of either of you.  We are less alike than identical twins, to be sure, 
but much more alike than strangers have any right to be.  Look at yourselves again… We 
ought to be equally long-lived but we won’t be.  We ought to be equally healthy but 
we’re not…We ought to think alike and feel alike and act alike, but of course we don’t.  
So plastic is humankind! Do you remember the old story of the Doppelgänger?  This is 
the double you recognize instantly, with whom you feel a mysterious kinship.  An instant 
sympathy, that informs you at once that the other is really your very own self”  (161-2) 
In the same way these women ought to feel, think and live similarly, if there was a single 
temporal course these four women ought to be similarly fated.  However, Jael has foreknowledge 
that what lies in Janet’s and her own presents will not occur in Jeanine and Joanna’s future.   
The future is plastic in the same way as humankind.  What constitutes this divergent 
course of history for both Joanna’s and Jeanine’s realities, then?  It is exactly by meeting their 
future selves, and exploring their worlds of alternate possibility that these women will avoid 
Jael’s dystopia and Janet’s utopia.  After this revelation, these four women’s worlds meet—they 
are  ‘diplomats’ for their worlds and travel to the dystopian Manland, where they witness Jael 
assassinate a man.  This journey reveals to the women the multiplicity of potential realities and 
the relationality between their four distinct worlds, fracturing any sense of unity in identity or 
history.  The final scene in the dystopian future renders the sexual mores of Jael’s separate 
society, where Womanland’s scientists have created ‘male’ sexual partners as a sort of 
programmed domestic servant, a cybernetic second sex. The ‘three J’s’ are voyeurs to Jael’s 
sexual practices with Davy, one of these cyborgs.  Upon realization she is not alone, Jael reflects:  
The original germ-plasm was chimpanzee, I think, but none of the behavior is organically 
controlled any more.  True, he does have his minimal actions which he pursues without 
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me—he eats, eliminates, sleeps, and climbs in and out of his exercise box—but even 
these are caused by a standing computer pattern. And I take precedence, of course.  It is 
theoretically possible that Davy has (tucked away in some nook of his cerebrum) 
consciousness of a kind that may never even touch his active life—is Davy a poet in his 
own peculiar way?—but I prefer to believe not.  His consciousness—such as it is and I 
am willing to grant it for the sake of argument—is nothing, a picturesque collocation of 
words.  It is experientially quite empty, and above all, it is nothing that need concern you 
and me.  Davy’s soul lies somewhere else; it’s an outside soul.  Davy’s soul is in Davy’s 
beauty; and Beauty is always empty, always on the outside. Isn’t it? (199) 
This moment when “Something pierces the sweetest solitude” represents a moment of 
‘mysterious kinship’ between the four J’s in which they come to knowledge of themselves by 
experiencing an alternative model of sexual difference (199). Immediately following this 
moment Jael makes her political desires known (bases in the other worlds for Womanland’s 
military conquest) and the text enters the ‘Book of Joanna.’   
This final section establishes the relationship of Manland, Womanland and Whileaway to 
the present.  Jeanine feels compelled to allegiance with Jael, Joanna seems ambivalent and Janet 
refuses to enter into political concord with Womanland.  Jeanine is a subject of the present, but 
her consciousness is so alienated from the human collectivity that she can wish its destruction, 
‘You can take the whole place over; I wish you would.  My whole world calls me Jeannie. See?’ 
(211).  Her experience in Womanland has made her world strange to her and makes her seek its 
destruction—the text could bring some readers to feel similarly.  Understanding what it’s like to 
be a member of the second sex, Jeanine feels a desire to dominate like Jael—she is comfortable 
with the prospect of a lover like Davy and a world like Womanland.   Janet, however, will not let 
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Jael’s ‘bad-angelry, luminous with hate’ into her utopian world (212).  Following her refusal, 
Jael rages and reveals the last aspect of the four worlds’ relationship: 
Let me give you something to carry away with you, friend:  the ‘plague’ you talk of is a 
lie. I know.  The world-lines around you are not so different from yours or mine or theirs 
and there is no plague in any of them, not any of them.  Whileaway’s plague is a big lie.  
Your ancestors lied about it.  It is I who gave you your ‘plague,’ my dear about which 
you can now pietize and moralize to your heart’s content; I, I, I, I am the plague, Janet 
Evason. I and the war I fought built your world for you, I and those like me, we gave you 
a thousand years of peace and love and the Whileawayan flowers nourish themselves on 
the bones of the men we have slain.  (211) 
It is only by Jael’s hateful bad-angelry that Whileaway and Janet exist. The utopian whom “we 
don’t believe in and [who] we deride but who is in secret our savior from utter despair, who 
appears Heaven-high…who comes from the place where the labia of the sky and horizon kiss 
each other so that Whileawayans call it the Door and know that all legendary things come 
therefrom” emerges from extreme violence (212-3). Violence done to the minds and bodies of 
men, impossible on Whileaway (because all the men are dead, significantly this utopia does not 
lack violence) and quite the opposite of the case in Joanna and Jeanine’s worlds, is a 
consequence of Jael’s future—this is the history that Janet’s utopia must level with and the future 
Joanna must turn away from. 
Janet is the salvation of our present, the telos of the history of observable worlds, but her 
subversion of despair is only accomplished by Jael and her war.  If we wish to avoid Jael’s 
dystopia, we will also forgo a utopia like Whileaway—for there is no plague in any known 
world-lines and that constitutes the origin story of Janet’s utopia.  How then can Janet save us?  
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The figure of a legendary potential future is ‘the labia of the sky and the horizon,’ the 
Whileawayan door—a vision of utopia beyond the worlds imagined in The Female Man.  This is 
the edge from which things emerge, a figure of creative energy.  This is the boundary that Janet 
traverses when she leaves Whileaway and the one across which she crosses back.  This crossing 
over, experiencing an alternative and finding new knowledge by it, constitutes salvation and 
legend.  The Whileawayan psychology tends toward an ‘irritable solipsism’—but “Eternal 
optimism hides behind this dissatisfaction, however; Whileawayans cannot forget that early 
paradise and every new face, every new day, every smoke, every dance, brings back life’s 
possibilities.  Also sleep and eating, sunrise, weather, the seasons, machinery, gossip, and the 
eternal temptations of art” (52).  The novel allows for the same thing, inviting us to bring 
possibility into life by imagining another kind of world-line outside of Jael’s narrative. 
Delighting in the utopian in the quotidian, Whileawayans perceive paradise and 
possibility in their relationship to each other and reality.  Janet overcomes the despair of 
solipsism even in Jeannine’s world, finding possibility in her relationship with the teenaged 
Laura, despite Whileaway’s taboo on sex across significant age difference.  Janet discovers 
possibility and remembers and recreates this experiential feeling of ‘paradise’ between humans 
and with the world, even in another world, our world.  Learning of the possibility of a dystopian 
and a utopian future, Joanna’s contact with her future potential selves brings new possibility for 
life in her world. Jael goes off with Jeannine, Janet returns home and Joanna watches them go. 
Discovering a mythic alternative, Joanna’s future is now open for her to make:  “In a moment, in 
the twinkling of an eye, we will be free.  I swear it on my own head.  I swear it on my ten 
fingers; We will be ourselves.  Until then I am silent; I can no more.  I am God’s typewriter and 
the ribbon is typed out” (213).  This potential free future exists beyond the narrative, when these 
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four women’s worlds have been typed out.  But indeed, this Book of Joanna shows foresight of 
this future for our present:   
Do not complain when at last you become quaint and old-fashioned, when you grow as 
outworn as the crinolines of a generation ago and are classed with Spicy Western Stories, 
Elsie Dinsmore, and The Son of the Sheik; do not mutter angrily to yourself when young 
persons read you to hrooch and hrch and guffaw, wondering what the dickens you were 
all about.  Do not get glum when you are no longer understood, little book.  Do not curse 
your fate.  Do not reach up from readers’ laps and punch the readers’ noses.  
  Rejoice, little book! 
  For on that day, we will be free.  (213-4) 
Is The Female Man becoming quaint and old-fashioned?  Unable to represent the utopian without 
naming men its enemy, on one level of reading The Female Man clings to identitarian politics—
I, I, I, I is its plague.  Joanna and her book are on the edge of a political struggle—Janet’s world, 
in so far as it is causally connected to Jael’s future, does not represent a livable human life, but 
the present is not satisfactory.  We are not yet free.  We are not yet ourselves. Thus the novel 
ends, unable to continue envisioning new worlds because The Female Man cannot look too far 
beyond that last part of Milton’s bogey, the I that blocks the view.  
 These three novels work to create new narratives and new possibilities through their 
representation of events that have not happened.  They imagine/author histories other than our 
own—through multiplicity of identity in Orlando, multiplicity of worlds in Woman on the Edge 
of Time, and the multiplicity of both in The Female Man— in order to illumine our own position 
in history.  In doing so, they imagine and create something like Eliot’s comparative historical 
consciousness.  We saw how Dido’s, Eve’s and the monster’s tragedies create the poetry of the 
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fallen within and against the poetry of hierarchical domination, and (if partially) allow us to turn 
away from the Roman, Christian, and Miltonic narrative definitions of the human that produce 
their tragedies.  In the same way, these “theorist for cyborgs’” imaginative works make a turn (if 
partial) away from Milton’s bogey or the poetry of hierarchical domination.  Without relying on 
redemption narratives, their poetry brings possibility to fallen-ness (haunted Orlando/the wild 
goose, embattled Connie/Mattapoisett, and Joanna/a utopia other than Whileaway).  These 
novels of partiality and multiplicity perform the work described as writing as a woman in A 
Room of One’s Own:   
It would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked like 
men, for if two sexes are quite inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the 
world, how should we manage with one only? Ought not education bring out and fortify 
the differences rather than the similarities? For we have too much likeness as it is, and if 
an explorer should come back and bring word of other sexes looking through the 
branches of other trees at other skies, nothing would be of greater service to humanity… 
(96)  
Writing the vastness and variety of the world, these novels do not bring word of other lives and 
worlds—instead, they create these other lives and worlds in their words.  With open-ended 
narratives (i.e. the ambiguous ending of Woman on the Edge of Time and the forward seeking 
endings of Orlando and The Female Man they not only create new stories about humanity and 
history but also summon other works to do the same in order to add to this vastness and variety.  
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the content (and to a significant extent, the language) of Aeneid VII-XII, Lavinia’s story (quite 
brief and marginalized in Vergil) is full of depth and possibility in Le Guin’s novel.  The ending 
engages with directly with the theme of women and Vergil’s poetry.  While Le Guin expresses 
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the fact that the novel is “in no way an attempt to change or complete the story of Aeneas” (274), 
its conclusion creates partiality and possibility out of Vergil’s poem: 
But I will not die.  I cannot.  I will never go down among the shadows under Albunea…I 
will not speak to Creusa of Troy, as I once thought I might, or Dido of Carthage, proud 
and silent, still bearing the great sword wound in her breast.  They lived and died as 
women do and as the poet sang them.  But he did not sing me enough life to die.  He only 
gave me immortality…I can hear the endless sound of the engines of war on all the roads 
of the world.  But I stay here.  I fly among the trees on soft wings that make no sound.  
Sometimes I call out, but not in a human voice:  My cry is soft and quavering: i, i, I cry: 
Go on, go.  Only sometimes my soul wakes as a woman again, and then when I listen I 
can hear silence, and in the silence his voice. (271-2) 
 
Le Guin, Ursula.  The Left Hand of Darkness.  New York:  Ace Books, 2000. 
 
One of the first science fiction novels I read, The Left Hand of Darkness served as an 
introduction to the other worlds and human lives that emerge in the genre.  Genly Ai’s narrative 
was the first taste I had of the feminist SF poetics that creates alternative possibilities and 
futures, in this case through imagining sexual difference otherwise.   
 
Muñoz, José Esteban.  Cruising Utopia:  The Then and There of Queer Futurity.  New York:  
New York UP, 2009. 
 
Muñoz’s discussion of queer utopianism and the queer aesthetic brought much out in my reading 
of partiality and possibilities in feminist SF.  His criticism was especially influential in my 
reading of the forward-seeking conclusions of Woolf’s and Russ’s novels and of the genre in 
general: “Queerness is that thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed 
something is missing…The aesthetic, especially the queer aesthetic, frequently contains 
blueprints and schemata of a forward-dawning futurity” (1).  
 
 
